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Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Abstract:       
When  nominal  wage  rigidity  is  large,  and  banking  sector  oligopolistic,  the 
benevolent government may prefer to regulate interest rates to boost labor demand. 
A government of a transition economy may postpone bank privatization to keep 
credit provision under control, as long as inefficiencies of state ownership are not 
prohibitive. We model a transition economy where the government initially owns 
enterprises  as  well  as  banks.  The  economy  features  constant  wage,  and  strong 
market power of banks. Under these conditions, we identify when the government 
has  incentive  to  privatize  enterprises  and/or  banks.  We  derive  conditions  under 
which  the  banking  socialism  (the  government  owns  banks,  but  privatizes 
enterprises) dominates other institutional modes: socialism, industrial socialism, and 
capitalism. 
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 1 Introduction
The literature on privatization in transition often abstracts from diﬀer-
ences in the ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial sectors (see Biais and Perotti 2002).
Nonetheless, to privatize banks may be a largely diﬀerent task than to pri-
vatize state-owned enterprises. Bank privatization implies loss of the credit
channel as a policy instrument, which might be costly for an employment-
maximizing government, facing strong unions and private banks with large
market power.
In this paper, we seek an explanation why the benevolent government
privatizes enterprises, but also keeps control of banks (banking socialism).
The intuition of paper is driven by experience of transition economies which
were, on the average, reluctant to privatize banks but not enterprises. Meg-
ginson (2005) calculated percents of total bank assets state owned in 1999
in 67 countries, and found the median for countries with “socialist origin”
to be as high as 40%, and the average of 40.14%. For all other countries,
the median was only 7% and the average 16.96%.
Gordon (2003) explains banking socialism by attempts to overcome dis-
tortions of corporate taxation; the government privatizes primarily capital-
intensive ﬁrms, for distortions therein are relatively small. State-owned
banks then provide cheap credit to privatized ﬁrms to overcome distortions.
We complement this view by another plausible aim; the government may
prefer credit control considering sticky wages and deadweight loss associ-
ated with market power of privatized banks.
As to the explanation of delays in bank privatization, Ambrus-Lakatos
and Hege (1998) alternatively suggest that the bank sale may lead to ex-
cessive liquidation or even credit crunch. The reason is that the private
owner has to signal hard-budget constraint to minimize moral hazard, but
the signalling is costly. In our model, we do away without incomplete in-
formation on the credit market and therefore without signalling, following
thus a parallel route of research.
Three topics in economics of transition are closely related to banking
socialism: optimal sequencing of reform, modes of privatization, and the
soft-budget constraint. Regarding sequencing (see, e.g., Lian and Wei 1998),
we side-step the problem by studying a one-period economy. We thus focus
on the short run, when voters evaluate the policy-maker retrospectively. It
would be possible to extend the paper into more periods, and allow growth
in the economy aﬀect here exogenous parameters (e.g. eﬃciency gap), which
would change the government’s optimum in next stages in favor of bank pri-
vatization, and nicely justify banking socialism as a transient phenomenon.
However, no additional explanation beyond a simple change in parameters
would be embedded in that plain extension.
The second stream of the literature concerns modes of privatization.
On one side, there are inﬂuential papers emphasizing strategic (“Machiavel-
1lian”) aspect of privatization, namely how the governing right-wing politi-
cians structure the value of shareholdings to aﬀect political preferences of
the middle class (Biais and Perotti 2002). Dispersed ownership of capital
is then a safeguard against possible renationalization, which explains why
right-wing governments resort to underpricing and quick speed. On the other
hand, a standard distributive mechanism may operate: eﬃciency gains from
private ownership can be redistributed into the hands of the policy-maker’s
constituency, mostly via underpriced assets (Ahrend 2002).
These explanations however omit the crucial importance of employment
for the transition government, and the widespread use of privatization to
further extra political and economic policy goals (see the comprehensive
empirical study by Jones et al. 1999). Moreover, the strategic motive to
prevent from re-nationalization (ensure time-consistent privatization policy)
loses appeal in a global economy where transition countries struggle for
FDIs, hence for credibility. A related issue is whether extra eﬀort into
maximization of employment is necessarily detrimental to eﬃciency; B¨ orner
(2003) argues that the commitment not to inﬂuence the proﬁt-maximizing
employment may be socially suboptimal, which invites a normative issue of
desirable privatization, addressed by this paper as well.
The empirical literature on bank privatization is not as far-reaching as
on general privatization, yet the main ﬁndings are nearly stylized facts:
bank privatization improves bank eﬃciency (Clarke, Cull and Shirley 2005),
the quality of the nation’s banking sector is signiﬁcant determinant of bank
privatization, but the political variables are not (Boehmer, Nash and Netter
2005). The latter invites an immediate inference that it is the median voter,
not special interest politics, which is decisive.
The third extensive stream of literature, concerned with the soft-budget
constraint, is also helpful for the purpose of our paper. Privatization is
not only driven by eﬃciency gains and the ensuing transfers, but also by
employment motive when labor markets feature some signiﬁcant barrier to
adjustment. Desai and Olofsgard (2006) attribute employment subsidies to
asymmetric information on the incumbent government’s inability to promote
job creation. This explains why the ﬁrst-best policy, i.e. a comprehensive
reform, is not adopted; the less competent politicians mimic the more compe-
tent ones by using hidden subsidies. We argue that information asymmetry
is plausible yet not necessary; subsidies occur even when interests of the
government is aligned with interests of the median voter as in early (nor-
mative) approach to soft-budget constraint, emphasized by Kornai, Maskin
and Roland (2003).
In this paper, we consider private ownership genuinely private. Thereby,
we abstract from institutional maze involved, for instance, in the Czech
banking sector, where the state-owned banks in fact exerted ownership con-
trol over the privatized enterprises. In that particular case, the lack of alter-
native domestic private capital (shallow pocket) empowered banks to launch
2major investment privatization funds, purchase shares in voucher privatiza-
tion, and the non-privatized banks became ultimate owners of “privatized”
enterprises.
In Section 2, we construct a transition economy with nominal wage rigid-
ity and market power of banks. We ﬁnd equilibria in four institutional
modes (socialism, industrial socialism, banking socialism, and capitalism)
in Section 3. In the next Section 4, we enrich the analysis of state-owned
enterprises by the possibility to use proﬁts for wage or credit subsidies. The
last Section 5 concludes.
2 The economy
2.1 Enterprises
The economy consists of the brownﬁeld (B) and the greenﬁeld (G) sector.
The brown companies are owned by the government, and can be priva-
tized. The green companies are owned by the private sector and cannot
be nationalized. Production requires labor L, capital K, and technology A,











The brown sector starts with an old technology, AB := a; if restruc-
tured, the sector can imitate a new technology used by green companies,
AG := 1, where a < 1. We assume that restructuralization of a brownﬁeld
is conditional on private ownership. The technology parameter thus cap-
tures managerial and organization incentives (e.g. eﬃciency contracts with
managers), which are assumed to be more eﬀective in corporate sphere.
The output is sold on international market for ﬁxed price P. The unit
labor cost is w, and capital is purchased for rG and rB (in general case, we
allow banks to discriminate between green and brown sectors).
The private owners of greenﬁelds always maximize proﬁts, that is they





With this expression, we can derive that a privatized brownﬁeld always
restructures into a greenﬁeld: by modifying (2) for private but still brown-
ﬁeld company, we get L
priv
B = a4LG and K
priv
B = a4LG. Inserting into proﬁt
1The speciﬁc parameters are algebraically convenient. A more important limitation
is that we use negative returns to scale, which allows us to avoid corner solutions for




B (rG) = a4πG(rG) < πG(rG), so proﬁts are strictly higher
for the greenﬁeld technology, for any level of interest rate rG.
The government maximizes utility of the median voter. In the elemen-
tary case (Section 3), it simply maximizes labor demand of brownﬁelds. In
a more sophisticated case (Section 4), the government can use proﬁts of
brownﬁelds and redistribute them as pure transfers or wage subsidies.
In the elementary case, the government is only restrained by the necessity
to generate non-negative proﬁts, πB ≥ 0. For any Cobb-Douglas production
function with non-zero coeﬃcients, even zero amount of capital contributes






B ) if privatized.
(3)
2.2 Labor market
Let n be the measure of individuals in the economy. An individual i ∈ 1...n
is working li units of time and enjoys 1 − li of free time. Only full-time
contracts are available, li ∈ {0,1/2}. Assume a constant wage rate w. The
assumptions of discrete choice over extent of job and of extreme wage rigidity
can be justiﬁed by the legacy of the socialist labor code, where the unions
had a prominent position.2 Notice that we forgo any heterogeneity in skills
to capture aggregate eﬀects.3
We deﬁne a quasi-linear utility function, where f(1 − li) is for utility of
leisure time, g(wli) denotes utility of income, and ωi ∈ [0,1] denotes the
individual preference for work,
Ui(w,l) = f(1 − l) + ωig(wl). (4)
For convenience, we use f(x) = x1/2, g(x) = 2x, which satisﬁes unique
optimum due to fx < 0 (marginal utility is decreasing in leisure time) and
gx = 2 (marginal utility is constant in working time). Suppose ω is uniformly
distributed on the interval [0,1], ω ∼ U[0,1].
Individual labor supply l∗
i is given by a binary choice, as the individual
compares the utilities of accepting and declining a full-time job oﬀer, Ui(w,0)
and Ui(w,1/2). In other words, the individual labor supply l∗
i is derived from
2In fact we need only partial rigidity to derive our main results, but allowing for
adjustment in wages would only bring excessive notation. We could also do without
constraints on contracts, with the eﬀect of a more complicated expression of total labor
supply.
3Heterogeneity of workers in a spirit of Balla et. al (2005) would not change the model;
if labor demand exceeded the size of high-skilled workers, they all would be employed, and
the eﬀect of unemployment would consider only low skilled workers. If not all high-skilled
workers could be employed, the low-skilled workers would be beyond reach of a benevolent
policy maker.













Alternatively, for each wage, we can identify the marginal individual,








2(1 − ˆ ω) (recall uniform distribution of ω).
In market with hypothetically excess of demand (LS ≤ LD), each in-
dividual supplying l∗
i = 1
2 would be satisﬁed. In market with excess sup-
ply (the standard case of sticky-wage market), unemployment appears at
amount 1− LD
LS ; we assume random rationing, i.e. individuals with non-zero
individual labor supply are randomly matched with available jobs. Hence,
utility function depends not only on individual labor supply, but also on the
status of the non-clearing job market:
Ui|ωi<ˆ ω = Ui(0)












We get the ﬁrst comparative properties. An increase in wage and labor
demand increases utility (dUi
dw ≥ 0, dUi
dLD ≥ 0), while an increase in population




The banks set interest rate for lenders at rC, and receive savings S(rC) =
σrC. Then, they distribute all credit borrowers: brown companies pay rB
and green companies pay rG, KB(rB) + KG(rG) = S(rC). Suppose that
savings come from households abroad, so the level of savings has no direct
inﬂuence on utility of individuals considered in the model. (We could alter-
natively have minority of rich households providing savings, which wouldn’t
aﬀect median voter’s welfare.)
Eﬃciency of banking system is denoted by the parameter σ, where
σ ∈ {σ,σ}. The more eﬃcient banking system, the more savings are at-
tracted for the identical level of interest rate. Although this deﬁnition looks
like marketing eﬃciency, it can represent operational eﬃciency, risk manage-
ment, and the like. Transition economy obviously starts with non-eﬃcient
banking, σ = σ, while privatized banking system features σ = σ > σ, which
reﬂects an assumption that the private owners dispose with contract and
proﬁt-sharing schemes which motivate managers to restructure.
52.4 Private banks
Besides improved operational eﬃciency, assume that the private banks have
market power over lenders, given by stringent entry requirements and other
banking sector regulation. Speciﬁcally, they can discriminate in price be-
tween marginal and inframarginal lenders. The marginal lender is paid rC
for his savings, while the inframarginal lender receives some r < rC, which
still exceeds opportunity costs. As a result, the banks don’t pay rCS for
savings at amount S(rC); suppose they pay exactly 3
4rCS. 4
Private owners always maximize proﬁts, π. We use that a proﬁt-maximizing
banker sets rG = rB, which is derived in Section 3.3. Thus, we can write
K(rG) := KG(rG) + KB(rG), and private banks set (rC,rG) = argmaxπ =
argmaxrGK(rG) − 3
4σr2














The government cannot employ an eﬃcient contract scheme, thus the state-
controlled banking sector is relatively ineﬃcient. More to that, the state-
owned bank cannot use market power over lenders, thus pays exactly rCS for
credit at amount S.5 This diﬀerence can be attributed also to pronounced
propensity for bailouts, incorporated into ex ante costs.
In the elementary case, suppose that the government is using banks as
a source of cheap credit for enterprises, regardless of private or public. In
the advanced case, the government can use bank proﬁts as pure transfers or
wage compensations. In the elementary case, maximization of labor demand
obviously involves minimization of interest rate for borrowers, hence rC =
rG. We denote this uniﬁed (socialist) interest rate rS, rS := rC = rG.
The interest rate is constrained only by necessity to generate zero proﬁts,






We study the optimal decision-making of a government which is driven
purely by interest in reelection. The sequence of activities is as follows. We
begin in socialist status quo; the government owns brownﬁelds and banks.
4Perfect discrimination would be for costs
1
2rCS, while non-discrimination is for rCS.
Our case is therefore exactly in the middle of the interval.
5This assumption could be relaxed without aﬀecting the main result; the state-
controlled bank could discriminate in price like the private bank does.
6Then, the government decides whether to privatize banks, brownﬁelds, both,
or none. In each institutional conﬁguration, banks and enterprises maximize
objective functions as explained above. On the basis of that, individuals get
utilities and re-elect the government. We abstract from political rents.
Since the utilities are linear in ωi, the utilities for any of the four insti-
tutional options are quasiconcave in ω. Therefore, it is the individual with
median preference ωi = 1/2 whose preference is decisive for the institutional
conﬁguration; if he prefers one institutional option to another, his prefer-
ence must be backed by a majority of voters. Throughout the paper, we
reasonably set that the median voter is job-seeking, in other words ˆ ω < 1/2
(otherwise, we would have a Monte-Carlo-like renters economy).
Anticipating preferences of a median voter, the reelection seeking gov-
ernment in equilibrium selects her optimum. As a result, identiﬁcation of
the optimal institutional choice requires utilities of the median voter.
The crucial question is what happens with proﬁts and proceedings from
privatization. As to proﬁts of private owners, we suppose that they don’t
reﬂect in the utility of the median voter. One interpretation is that they
ﬂow abroad; another is that the share of investors in the population is negli-
gible to be worth incorporating into the utilities. Proﬁts of the government
operating brownﬁelds and banks can be used for direct transfers, or wage
subsidies, which is studied in Section 4.
We recognize the following four institutional conﬁgurations:
Socialism (SO) Brownﬁelds and banks are not privatized. Banks are in-
eﬃcient (σ = σ), and set such rS that proﬁts are zero. Brownﬁelds
are not restructuralized (AB = a) and maximize labor demand up to
the point of zero proﬁts.
Industrial socialism (IS) Banks are private and eﬃcient (σ = σ), and
maximize proﬁts, setting (rC,rG). State-owned brownﬁelds are not
restructuralized (AB = a) and the state therein maximizes labor de-
mand.
Banking socialism (BS) Banks are not privatized, thus ineﬃcient (σ =
σ), setting rS to have zero proﬁts. Brownﬁelds are privatized, restruc-
turalized (AB = 1), and maximize proﬁts.
Capitalism (CA) Both banks and brownﬁelds are privatized and restruc-
tured, (σ = σ and AB = 1), and both maximize proﬁts.
We are particularly interested in cases when banking socialism dominates
not only socialism and industrial socialism, but also capitalism.
73.1 Socialism
The costs of socialism are obvious, namely large ineﬃciencies in all sectors.
The low ability of a socialist bank to allocate credit eﬃciently is reﬂected
by σ < σ, and the low performance in state-owned enterprises is reﬂected
by a < 1.
What are the beneﬁts of socialism? In banking sector, the government
doesn’t collect proﬁts, so it may set a lower interest rate than the private
banks, unless relative ineﬃciency is too large. In brownﬁelds, the govern-
ment is targeting the total amount of labor, not the marginal productivity
of labor like the private owner.
We already know that for the socialist bank, KB = 0, and it funds only
the private (greenﬁeld) sector. Since the private sector contributes to the
total labor demand by LSO
G (rS), it sets rS so as to maximize the green labor





























Like in socialism, the brown sector requires no bank funding, so brownﬁeld
labor demand is identical to the case of socialism. However, labor demand of
greenﬁeld sector may diﬀer. The private banks make credit more expensive
because of market-power exploitation, but are more eﬃcient, which lowers
the interest rates. What is the optimal interest rate of the private bank for



























Proposition 1 Median voter prefers industrial socialism to socialism, if
and only if 3σ < σ.
8Proof In elementary model, only LD is variable of institutional conﬁgu-
rations. For median voter’s utility, dUi









D is equivalent to LIS
G > LSO
G .
With (7) and (9), we easily rewrite rIS
G < rSO
S into 3σ < σ. Putting all
equivalences together complements the proof. 
To lose credit channel but not privatize brownﬁelds is thus suboptimal to
socialist status quo, unless diﬀerences between banking sector performances
are overwhelming. This drives our intuition on the importance of state
control of banks when labor demand stimulation is politically desirable.
3.3 Banking socialism
In this case, the state controls the banks, but none of the productive sectors.
Labor demand is maximized by provision of cheap credit.
We ﬁrstly consider possibility to lower interest rate to one sector at the
expense of another sector. The pair (rB,rG) would have to satisfy KB(rB)+
KG(rG) = KB(rS) + KG(rS) = σr2
S. Imposing capital demands of private













We maximize labor demand subject to rB = argmaxLG(rG) + LB(rB)









This implies rG = rB. Selective credit manipulation is not a feasible way
for the government aiming to boost employment. Moreover, as the state-
owned bank minimizes credit, we have rS = rG = rB. From that, we derive









































Proposition 2 Median voter prefers capitalism to banking socialism, if and
only if 3σ < σ.
Proof Analogically to proof of Proposition 1, we use that rCA
G < rBS
G if
and only if 3σ < σ. 
3.5 Pros and cons
Propositions 1 and 2 give, under all circumstances, a threshold condition
for bank privatization. Privatization of banks is contingent only upon the
relatively ineﬃciency of banks under private and public ownership; unless
the diﬀerence is large, banks are better to rest under state control.
We look for all conditions under which banking socialism dominates other
alternatives. By the threshold condition, we get that if banking socialism
dominates capitalism, then socialism dominates industrial socialism. There-
fore, we only rest to ﬁnd the missing condition under which banking social-
ism dominates socialism.
Proposition 3 Median voter prefers banking socialism to all alternatives,












Proof Part one is implication of Propositions 1 and 2. Analogically to
proofs of previous propositions, we have that utility of the median voter is
maximized for maximum LD. Re-writing LBS
D > LSO




With Proposition 3, we can derive comparative properties leading to the
dominance of banking socialism:
1. Narrow bank eﬃciency gap. The smaller is the eﬃciency gap of public
banks (σ/σ), the less pronounced is incentive to privatize banks.
102. Development of ﬁnancial market. The more eﬃcient public banks (σ
grows), the higher incentive to privatize brownﬁelds. This may also
be the case when total amount of savings increase, for instance due to
external price liberalization.
3. Large technology gap. The higher is the technology gap between non-
restructured and restructured brownﬁelds (1/a), the more important
it is to privatize brownﬁelds.
4. Low wage rigidity. The lower wage rigidity (the clearer labor market),
the better it is to privatize brownﬁelds.
5. High product price. The higher price of the product P, the more
beneﬁcial is privatization of brownﬁelds.
4 The use of proﬁts
So far, we supposed that the government creates zero proﬁts when owning
brownﬁelds and banks. This is optimal when proﬁts have no other use and
the only goal is labor-demand maximization. However, proﬁts can be used in
a variety of other ways, which contribute to the utility function. In the case
of brownﬁelds, a state-owned ﬁrm could create proﬁts and redistribute them
to all individuals. The second option is to withdraw proﬁts from brownﬁelds
and use them as wage subsidies to greenﬁelds and/or brownﬁelds. These
options modify optimums in socialist and industrial socialist cases.
4.1 Pure transfers
The government owning brownﬁelds now decides to decrease production
of brownﬁelds from the scope where marginal labor productivity is very
low, and use the proﬁts for direct transfers. Suppose the proﬁts ΠB are
distributed by a uniform per capita transfer ΠB/n. The government aims




We put the constraint into the utility function of the median voter
(ωi = 1
2), under assumption of positive unemployment (LD < LS), and
the optimum yields the optimal (ΠB,LB), where
LB =
 









Hence, the extent of transfers and labor stimulation depend only on the
level of rigidity, where ˆ w = 3
2(2 − 1
2) is the critical level:
w ≤ ˆ w =⇒ LB ≤ LSO
B =⇒ ΠB ≥ 0
w > ˆ w =⇒ LB > LSO
B =⇒ ΠB < 0 (16)
11This reveals that the government optimizes the magnitude of production
in two ways. For suﬃciently small rigidity, it generates positive proﬁts that
are redistributed among citizens. In a more relevant case (given positive
unemployment), it creates deﬁcit, paid by citizens, that is used for stimula-
tion of production. Of course, the latter option requires that costless and
non-distortional taxes can be imposed. If the government cannot tax, it is
bound by liquidity constraint, and LB = LSO
B . Then, transfers are used
as an instrument only for cases of low nominal wage rigidity; otherwise,
the government fully stimulates production of brownﬁelds, eliminating all
proﬁts.
We have an indication that the relative importance of direct transfers
from brownﬁelds declines in wage, i.e. with higher nominal wage rigidity. We
can establish this ﬁnding formally. Since we have an additively separable
utility function, where marginal utility of additional transfer and additional
labor demand are constant, we can directly compare utility increases given
by increase in transfers and decrease in the labor demand in brownﬁelds
(respectively, increase in taxes and increase in labor demand). For any pair
(ΠB,LB), we have:
U(Π,LB) − U(Π,0) = U(0,LB) − U(0,0)
U(Π,LB) − U(0,LB) = U(Π,0) − U(0,0)












This reinforces intuition that each individual has diﬀerent relative inter-
est in maintaining transfers vs. creating jobs. The ratio clearly declines in
ωi, so those who value income highly welcome transfers relatively less than
those who emphasize leisure time.
We can further maintain that an increase in wage (the more pronounced
problem of nominal rigidity) leads to the higher role of job-creation and lower
role of transfers. It is suﬃcient to examine how the relative importance of










2 − 2)2 < 0. (18)
The median voter favors less transfers when the wage rate increases; a
similar outcome could be derived for any i, where l∗
i = 1
2. The only group
which opposes that is the group of those who refuse to work (l∗
i = 0); for
them, there is no trade-oﬀ between transfers and additional jobs, because
U(ΠB,LB) − U(ΠB,0) = 0. In other words, when transfers are available,
those out of the labor market are no more indiﬀerent about the level of labor
12demand, but prefer the demand that maximizes proﬁts of brownﬁelds. A
bit paradoxically, it is the group of non-workers who push the government
to behave like a private owner. Nonetheless, in our simple median-voter
speciﬁcation, they are not in majority unless ˆ ω ≥ 1/2 (renters’ economy).
Can banking socialism be chosen even under the possibility of direct
transfers from brownﬁeld proﬁts? First, since the transfer option is iden-
tical in socialism and industrial socialism, the two diﬀer only in the level
of employment in greenﬁeld sector, which is described in condition 3σ > σ.
Therefore, this condition is unchanged. What surely changes is the other
condition; since the case with positive transfers necessarily weakly domi-
nates the case without transfers (which is a special case of zero transfers),
we can conclude that σ has to pass a higher threshold to sustain victory of




2w + 21/2 − 2
w + 21/2 − 2
w + 23/2 − 3
23/2 − 3
(19)
4.2 Wage subsidies within brownﬁelds
Excessive wage is the key source of mismatch between labor demand and
labor supply. If the government can use a wage subsidy, it contributes to
market clearing, even at an ineﬃciently high level employment. The labor
supply can’t adjust, but jobs that pay an eﬀectively lower wage than w can
be ﬁlled if the government provides a wage subsidy to the enterprises (e.g.,
in the form of social insurance deductions).
To pay a wage subsidy from state-owned brownﬁeld proﬁts is unfortu-
nately nothing but a transfer from one pocket to another. Suppose that
the government selects an optimal pair of transfer and labor in brownﬁelds
(ΠB,LB). This pair must be feasible, that is it corresponds to the produc-
tion function, ΠB = aPL
1/2
B − wLB.
Suppose the enterprises increase production with subsidized work, and
generate additional proﬁts Πa. The proﬁts have to be re-paid by wage
subsidies at amount Πa/LB, therefore the eﬀective wage paid by brownﬁelds









LB = ΠB + Πa. (20)
By multiplication, we of course only replicate the standard constraint,
so the optimal pair (ΠB,LB) is identical. In other words, the government
has no incentive to change behavior, and will not use wage subsidies for
brownﬁelds that are withdrawn from their proﬁts.
134.3 Wage subsidies to greenﬁelds
Government may target the wage subsidies into the greenﬁeld sector, for
greenﬁelds have better technology than non-privatized brownﬁelds, thus a
higher potential of job-creation. How would that work? For the moment,
we neglect the simultaneous possibility of wage subsidies and pure transfers
and assume proﬁts to be used exclusively as wage subsidies to greenﬁelds.
The government thus determines the size of the proﬁts extracted, Πa, and
commands brownﬁelds to produce as much as to cover costs plus the proﬁt
extracted, and distributed the proﬁts to greenﬁelds in a form of a wage
subsidy per unit of labor Πa/LG. Therefore, greenﬁelds operate with lower














From maximization of LD = LB+LG, we might get an (albeit extremely
long) polynomial that would lead to the explicit solution. Here, a suﬃcient











We want to check if the wage subsidies to greenﬁelds are positive, or
negative. In the latter case, the government would tax greenﬁelds and use
the revenues for the production of brownﬁelds (of course only if such a
corporate tax is feasible). The sign of wage subsidy is derived from the sign
of proﬁts; positive proﬁts entail a positive subsidy and vice versa. Denote
the labor demands when the wage subsidy is zero (known from preceding
section) as LB(0) and LG(0).
First, for strictly positive proﬁts, we have ΠB > 0, which implies LB <
LB(0) and LG > LG(0). On the other hand, for strictly negative proﬁts, we
have that LB > LB(0) and LG < LG(0). To sum up:












As we know the function LG(LB) from (22), we can compute LG(LB(0)),
14and compare:






=⇒ Π > 0






=⇒ Π < 0 (23)
We simply used the fact that relative share of employment between
brownﬁelds and greenﬁelds has to be higher after a positive subsidy for
greenﬁelds, and lower after a negative subsidy (tax) for greenﬁelds. In our
example, we rewrite into conditions:
wσ1/3 < 221
79 =⇒ Π > 0
wσ1/3 > 221
79 =⇒ Π < 0 (24)
The incentive to favor greenﬁelds instead of brownﬁelds thus falls in wage
rate, and eﬃcacy (extent) of ﬁnancial system. We also found that cheap
capital is a substitute of government intervention; here, higher σ makes
government less interested in assistance to capital-using sector, that is to
greenﬁelds.
5 Conclusion
This paper developed a model where the government seeking reelection by
the retrospectively voting median voter doesn’t privatize banks, and main-
tains status quo with the low bank eﬃciency. We identiﬁed two conditions
which describe the willingness of the government not to privatize banks,
but at the same time privatize state-owned enterprises. The two conditions
also identify when any of the other three institutional conﬁgurations (social-
ism, industrial socialism, or capitalism) is optimal. The conditions can be
used for comparative empirical studies on the relative beneﬁts of delays in
privatization of banks and enterprises.
In the simple model, the government couldn’t generate proﬁts. We ex-
tended that into a case when brownﬁelds proﬁts could be used as pure
transfers, or wage subsidies for greenﬁelds. In the case of pure transfers,
we identiﬁed critical conditions for the non-negative level of transfers, and
discussed political involvement of pure beneﬁciaries who are out of labor
market. In the case of wage subsidies, we derived situations when subsi-
dies are actually negative, namely represent additional taxes imposed upon
greenﬁelds.
The model can be enlarged by considering credit subsidies to greenﬁelds
paid from proﬁts of brownﬁelds. Enterprise privatization can also be mod-
eled as an implicit labor market reform, aiming at reduction of wage rigidity.
Another important option is to insert proceedings from the privatization
sales into the cost-beneﬁt analysis of the government.
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